PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. . Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. . Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. Suns and Stars Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. McNamara was ready to respond. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Send the First Troops to Vietnam? 302-303. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. (2021, February 16). The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. 14. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. 313-314. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. National Security Agency While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. 9. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Tonkin Gulf In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation.